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CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
A NEW FUNCTION FOR COURTS-
DECLARING THE RIGHTS OF
PARTIES.
In a recent opinion of the Supreme Court
of the United States Justice Holmes makes
this interesting observation:-
"The foundation of jurisdiction is phys-
ical power, although in civilized times it is
not necessary to maintain that power
throughout proceedings properly begun."'
Paraphrased, the statement comes to
this:
In early 'times the basis of jurisdiction
is the existence and the constant assertion
of physical power over the parties to the
action, but as civilization advances the
mere existence of such power tends to
make its exercise less and less essential.
If this is true, it must be because there
is something in civilization itself which
diminishes the necessity for a resort to
actual force in sustaining the judgments
of courts. And it is quite clear that civiliza-
tion does supply an element which is
theoretically capable of entirely supplanting
the exercise of force in the assertion of
jurisdiction. This is respect for law. If
the parties to the action desire to obey the
law, a mere determiiation by the court of
their reciprocal rights and duties is enough.
No sheriff with his writ of injunction or
execution need shake the mailed fist of the
State in the faces of the litigants. The
judgment of the court merely directs the
will of the parties, and the performance of
duty becomes the automatic consequence
of the declaration of right.
It is not to be assumed that the peace-
ful acquiescence of the highly civilized man
in the legal findings of the court implies
any loss of power in the court itself. Quite
the contrary. The greater the ease with
which the court's findings impose them-
selves on litigants, the more the real power
of the court is demonstrated. But the
(1) McDonald v. Mabee (Decided March G,
1917), 37 Sup. Ct. Reporter 343.
No. 1
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force behind the finding of the court has
become a latent instead of an active force.
This transition is possible, however, only
when the existence of the force is so well
recognized and so clearly understood that
no one would think it worth while to put
it to the test. The entire cessation of act-
ual coercive measures on the part of the
court would therefore mark, not the dis-
appearance, but the perfection of the rule
of force.
2
The modern observer, noting this cor-
relation between social progress and the de-
cline in the need for outward display of
force in the administration of justice, may
well ask himself why we have not done
better than we appear to have done. If
the existence of force is enough, Wiithout
its exercise, to sustain the court in its find-
ings, why do we not show a realization of
that fact in our remedial machinery. If
the power of the state stands irresistibly
behind our judicial decisions, why take so
much pains to clothe them with the out-
ward show of authority? Why display the
sheriff and his writ with so much ostenta-
tion? We do not arm our traffic policemen
with guns and cutlasses. Why insist that
the court must always rattle the sabre?
To make a specific application of this
general criticism, let it be-asked why our
judicial system does not provide a means
for merely determining and declaring
rights. If our civilization is not a sham,
and the state is understood to be equal to
the task of enforcing the decrees of its
courts, a mere declaration may serve every
purpose of an order, and the order will
become unnecessary. A declaration by the
court that A is entitled to the immediate
possession of a chattel in B's possession,
should be equally effective in A's behalf as
a judgment that A do have and recover
of B the possession of the chattel. A ju-
dicial declaration that a certain city ordi-
nance is invalid ought to serve equally as
(2) SaInond. Jurisprudence, Ed. 4, p. 66.
well as an injunction against its enforce-
ment. Furthermore, the remedial possibili-
ties in such declaratory judgments are
much greater than in judgments for relief,
and they open up an entirely new field for
judicial usefulness, as will be hereinafter
pointed out.
The answer to the question, why our
courts do not make declarations of right,
with or without relief, is probably his-
torical, and lies in the philosophical con-
ceptions of rights and remedies which have
long been current in common law juris-
prudence.
The common law was wedded to the
idea of a wrongful act on somebody's part
as a necessary condition precedent to ju-
dicial action.
Thus Holland, speaking of remedial
rights, or rights of recourse of justice,
says :--"The causes, or 'investitive facts,'
of remedial rights are always infringe-
ments of antecedent rights * * * ".3 And
again, he says: 'So long as all goes well,
the action of the law is dormant. When
the balance of justice is disturbed by
wrongdoing, or even by a threat of it, the
law intervenes to restore, as far as pos-
sible, the status quo ante."4  And in still
further emphasis of this same characteristic
of the court, as an ex post facto agency, he
says:-"If all went smoothly, antecedent,
or primary, rights would alone exist.
Remedial, or sanctioning, rights are merely
part of the machinery provided by the state
for the redress of injury done to anteced-
ent rights. This whole department of law
is, in an especial sense 'added because of
transgressions'. ' '
Salmond expresses the same view as to
the function of courts and the conditions
under which they may be used by litigants.
He says :-"Both in civil and in criminal
proceedings there is a wrong (actual or
threatened) complained of. For the law
(3) Jurisprudence, Ed. 9, p. 310.
(4) Jurisprudence, p. 306.
(5) Jurisprudence, p. 139.
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will not enforce a right except as against
a person who has already violated it, or
who has at the least already shown an in-
tention of doing so. Justice is administered
only against wrongdoers, in act or in in-
tent.""
Courts of equity operate upon the same
theory of remedial justice as courts of law.
Thus, injunctions are granted to restrain
threatened wrongs, specific performance is
decreed in case of breach of certain con-
tracts, various remedies are available
against those who are guilty of fraud or
whose claims wrongfully rest on accident
or mistake, an accounting may be had to
test the accounts of those who are charged
to have profited at the plaintiff's expense,
titles are quieted against those wrongfully
asserting rights hostile to the title of the
plaintiff. In the case of bills for discovery,
there is usually an action at law to which
the bill is ancillary, and furthermore the
party against whom the discovery is sought
may be deemed to be wrongfully refusing
to disclose. In all of these cases coercive
relief is granted. A single exception serves
only to make the rule more striking, and
this is the administrative control exercised
by courts of equity over trusts, permitting
a resort by the trustee to the court to ob-
tain a judicial construction of his powers
and responsibilities under the terms of the
trust instrument.
Proof of the accuracy of this summary
of the attitude of courts of equity, in ac-
cordance with which they refuse to take
-jurisdiction of cases not calling for coer-
cive relief, may be found in the express
language of our courts. Thus in Woods
v. Fuller,' the Supreme Court of Maryland
said:-"A Court of equity will not take
jurisdiction, unless it can afford immediate
relief * * * It must be borne in mind that
the decree of a Court of equity, and not
its opinion, is the instrument through which
it acts in granting relief. However sound
(6) Jurisprudence, p. 71.
"(7) (1884) 61 Md. 457.
and clear such opinion may be, as an ab-
stract proposition of law, yet if the princi-
ple it declares cannot be carried into effect
by a decree, in the case in which it is given,
it is wholly valueless, and an idle and
nugatory act."
In Greeley v. Nashuas the city of Nashua
filed a bill to detennine its rights to cer-
tain property devised to it under a will,
and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
said :-"The plaintiffs * * * request the
court to inform them what their legal
rights and those of the defendants are in
the property devised. The court might
with equal propriety be called upon by the
parties interested to advise them regarding
the title to land, the construction of a con-
tract; or any other question of law. Such
questions are not ordinarily adjudicated
until it becomes necessary to decide them
in proceedings instituted for the redress of
wrongs." The court then goes on to say
that "they are prospectively determined by
a court of equity in behalf of trustees who
in the execution of the trust are entitled
to its protection. Trustees are not re-
quired to incur risk in the management or
distribution of the trust fund." Could any-
thing be more quaintly suggestive of the
ancient bigotry of the common law, when
the judges hoarded their remedies as jeal-
ously as misers hoarded their gold? Pro-
tection must be saved for trustees, for if
granted to others the supply might run
short!
And in Bevans v. Bevans9 a bill was filed
to obtain the construction of a will with
respect to the title to real estate. The
Chancellor of New Jersey said:-" * *
It is settled that the court will not express
opinions in regard to construction for the-
mere information of parties, disconnected
from some equitable relief sought."
In accordance with this view of the de-
fendant as an alleged wrongdoer, and the
action as one founded upon his actual or
(8) (1882) 62 N. H. 166.
(9) (1905) 69 N. J. EQ. 1.
No. I
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threatened wrong, it is quite true that a
judgment for relief against him would al-
ways be appropriate, and would fully meet
the situation. So the law reasoned, and
so it ruled. If coercive relief might al-
ways be granted, it ought always to be
granted, for why make a mere declaration
of right against a wrongdoer who is before
the court and subject to its power. Why
merely tell him that he has no right to do
as he proposes when the court can just
as well prohibit the act. \Why merely ad-
vise when it can as well command?
The United States has, in every depart-
ment of its legal practice, accepted with-
out question the foregoing theory of
remedial justice. We have not allowed
our developing civilization, with its con-
stantly increasing respect for law, to pro-
duce any effect upon judicial functions.
We refuse to allow parties to appear in
court except under conditions which per-
mit a display of force by' the judicial arm
of the state.
England has been much more enterpris-
ing. In 1852, parliament took the first step
to abandon this archaic conception of
remedial law. In that year an act was
passed amending the practice of the High
Court of Chancery, and one of the sections
of that act provided as follows-
"No suit in the said court shall be open
to objection on the ground that a merely
declaratory decree or order is sought there-
by, and it shall be lawful for the court to
make binding declarations of right without
granting consequential relief." 0
This statute, while striking in its novelty,
was subject to' strict limitations. It ap-
plied only to Courts of Chancery, and it
was construed to embrace only those cases
where there was consequential relief which
might be granted, but wvhich the parties
did not care to ask for or receive."
(10) 15 and 16 Viet., c. 86, s. 50.
(11) Rooke v. Kensington (1856), 2 K. & J.
753, 761.
But reforms moved swiftly in England.
In 1873 the Judicature Act completely
broke the shackles with which conventional-
ity had burdened the administration of jus-
tice. And in the rejuvenation which the
law experienced, all the limitations upon
declaratory judgments which the old statute
had retained, were swept away. The new
rule was put into force in 1883, as Rule 5
of Order 25, and provided as follows:-
"No action or proceeding shall be open to
objection, ofn the ground that a merely de-
claratory judgment or order is sought there-
by, and the court may make binding declara-
tions of right whether any consequential
relief is or dould be claimed or not."
This rule introduced "an innovation of a
very important kind," to use the words of
Justice Lindley.2 It threw open to the
court the right to do just what the Chan-
cellor of New Jersey declared in Bevans
v. Bevans (supra), that courts would never
do, namely, "express opinions in regard to
construction for the mere information of
parties * * * "
Later, another rule was added which is
probably to be deemed a mere specification
of a class of cases originally embraced
within the terms of the foregoing rule,
whic'h provided in express words that-
"In any division of the high court, any
person claiming to be interested under a
deed, will, or other written instrument, may
apply by originating summons for the de-
termination of any question of construction
arising under the instrument, and for a dec-
laration of the rights of the persons in-
terested."
This was Order 54 A, Rule 1, passed in
1893.
For thirty-five years the English courts
have exercised this jurisdiction, both at law
and in equity, of advising parties as to
their rights, with or without coercive relief
at the option of the parties.
(12) Ellis v. Duke of Bedford (1899), 1 Ch.
494, 515.
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Now, two different classes of cases,
based upon different principles, are pre-
sented by the present English rules.
1. We have first the cases where
coercive relief might be had, but it is not
desired. Here there is merely a new
remedial right granted to the plaintiff. He
has a cause of action of the conventional
type, but he wants to use it for a new pur-
pose. Instead of asking that the defend-
ant be ordered to perform his contract, he
only wants the court to assure him and in-
form the defendant that he has no right
to performance. Instead of enjoining the
defendant from taking certain action, he
merely asks the court to advise him and
the defendant whether the latter has a
right to take it.
The advantages of asking advice instead
of coercive relief are important. In the
first place it presents in the pleading a spe-
cific and express issue of law, which 'can
usually be answered yes or no, and which
will settle the controversy between the par-
ties. In this way the scope of the legal
inquiry presented by the pleadings is clari-
fied and limited. Furthermore, the issue of
law is not one which must, as in case of a
demurrer, be developed without any ac-
companying issue of fact. It is usually an
issue of law to be decided upon the out-
come of the trial or hearing, so that al-
most every case is capable of being pre-
sented as a case for advice. Thus a dec-
laration of right may be asked as to a con-
tract which plaintiff alleges contains cer-
tain provisions. If the defendant denies
some of the terms alleged, the declaration
of right will be based on the terms which
the evidence substantiates. If one were
inclined to question the advantage of this
procedure in simplifying the issues, a
glance through some of the current Eng-
lish reports would convince him of its ef-
fect. The question to be decided is al-
ways the correctness 'of the declaration
asked, and the court has only to answer the
specific questions thus put to it.
By asking for the declaration of right the
party makes definite and certain the theory
of his case, and the court is never at a
loss to understand exactly what is in issue
between the parties.
But there is another result which this
procedure accomplishes in cases where
coercive relief might be had, and that is
a psychological one. Every case may by
this means become, in appearance at least,
a friendly suit. There is no doubt that the
personal animosities developed by litiga-
tion are serious drawbacks to the useful-
ness of the courts. To sue is to fight, and
fights make endless feuds. Parties hesitate
to resort to the courts because they shrink
from a state of war'with their neighbors
or business associates. But if the courts
could operate as diplomatic instead of bel-
ligerent agencies, less hesitation would be
felt over recourse to them, and less strain
would be put upon the friendly relations
of the parties. To ask the court merely
to say whether you have certain contract
rights as against the defendant is a very
different thing from demanding damages or
an injunction against him. When you ask
for a declaration of right only, you treat
him as a gentleman. When you ask coer-
cive relief you treat him as a wrongdoer.
That is the whole difference between di-
plomacy and war; the former assumes that
both parties wish to do right, the latter is
based on an accusation of wrong. A re-
quest for a declaration of right plainly im-
plies full confidence that the defendant will
promptly and voluntarily do his duty as
soon as the court points it out to him. It
indicates a willingness to rely on the de-
fendant's sense of honor, as a sufficient
remedy. It makes the lawsuit a co-opera-
tive proceeding, in which the court merely
assists the parties to settle their oN ,n differ-
ences by stating to them the rules of law
which govern them.
These considerations alone are enough to
recommend the practice in any country
where respect for the rights of others is
No. ICENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
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considered a virtue. The force behind the
court is not at all weakened by it, for it
appears that the plaintiff's confidence in the
defendant's readiness to do right is mis-
placed, the coercive decree of the court is
always ready to be promptly issued in sup-
port of its declaration.
2. An entirely different situation, how-
ever, is presented in those cases where no
coercive relief can be granted. Here there
is an entire absence of a cause of action in
the conventional sense. Since the defend-
ant has not yet done or threatened anything
wrong, nor failed to do all that is lawfully
incumbent upon him, there is nothing for
the court to operate upon, if we accept the
definitions of a cause of action set forth in
an earlier portion of this article. If reme-
dial rights arise only in support of primary
rights infringed or threatened, there can be
no remedial right of any kind in such cases.
To account for the right to a declaratory
judgment in cases where no relief is pos-
sible, it seems necessary to boldly concede
that the statute which authorizes it has
created not a new remedy merely,' but a
new primary right. The old primary
rights were the correlatives of duties call-
ing for present action on the part of the
defendant. These were infringed when
the defendant failed to do what the law
required. They were all based on a social
system which considered justice as a by-
product of force, and which saw no need
for judicial administration concerning it-
self with any but wrongdoers.. The com-
mon law never looked upon the courts as
agencies useful for enabling parties to keep
out of trouble. That was the business of
the lawyers. It never admitted that any
one had a legal right to know what his
rights were.
The new rule authorizing' declaratory
judgments in cases where no relief is pos-
sible, gives one the right to know his
rights. Since ignorance of the law ex-
cuses no one, the law will furnish an oracle
to declare it. Assuming that parties in-
tend to do right, it will point out the way
they should go. To use a homely figure,
prior to 1883 the English courts were em-
ployed only as repair shops; since that
time they have been operated as service
stations.
The field which the new rule opens is a
wide and fruitful one, and by contrast
makes the old practice, which is of course
the current American practice, seem in-
credibly stupid. It furnishes remedies
which no civilized country ought to deny
to its citizens, and the lack of them is a
serious hardship in this country.
The practice of making declarations of
right has completely revolutionized Eng-
lish remedial law. The American lawyer
who peruses the current English reports is
bewildered by their novelty. He is like a
modern Rip Van \Vinkle, who, having gone
to sleep in an age when courts were only
the nemesis of wrongdoers, awakens to find
that they have become the guardians and
advisers of those who respect the law.
The only recourse of an American who
wishes to get a forecast of his rights is to
consult his lawyer. But the lawyer's
opinion is without the slightest binding
force. Vast interests may be at stake, but
all the client can do is to gamble on the
sagacity of his counsel.
In England such compulsory gambling
has been outgrown. The client consults
his lawyer, the lawyer, in case of doubt,
frames a case for the court, and the court,
on a full hearing with all interested parties
before it, makes a final and binding declara-
tion on which the client can act with per-
fect security. The practice is so convenient
and so obviously advantageous that it has
become almost a matter of course in Eng-
lish chancery cases and is very common on
the law side of the court. An examination
of a recent volume of Chancery reports.
volume 9 for 1916, shows that out of 64
cases reported, 43 were brought for dec-
larations of right. It would be safe to
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say that approximately two-thirds of -the
current Chancery litigation in the Supreme
Court of Judicature is directed to obtain-
ing the advice of the court as to rights of
litigant parties, with or without prayers
for consequential relief.
The cases in the volume of chancery re-
ports above mentioned will illustrate the
nature and range of questions put to the
cou't for determination. Thus, in Lovesy
v. Palmer, 13 plaintiff asked for a declara-
tion that certain memoranda and letters
constituted a. binding contract between the
defendants and the plaintiff to make a
lease of a theatre. In Smith, Coney &
Barrett v. Becker, Gray & Co., 4 the plaintiff
asked for declarations that certain con-
tracts which they had made with defendants
were illegal by reason of the proclamation
of a state of war between Great Britain
and Germany. In Re Lodwig" the plain-
tiff asked the court to declare whether cer-
tain trusts were void for remoteness. In
Re New Chinese Antimony Co., Lim., 0
the liquidator of a company asked the court
to determine and declare the correlative
rights of the preferred and common share-
holders in the assets of the company. In
Re Chafer and Randall's Contract 7 plain-
tiff asked a declaration that the abstract
of title delivered by the defendant to the
plaintiff did not show a good title. In Cas-
sel v. Inglis' plaintiff asked the court to
declare that he had been illegally excluded
from membership in the Stock Exchange.
In Coleman v. London County and West-
minster Bank, Lim.," the court was asked
to decide the question of priorities in cer-
tain debentures as between the plaintiff and
defendant. In Parsons v. Equitable In-
vestment Co., Lim., ° the court was asked
to declare that a certain bill of sale was
(1916)
(1916)
(191 6)
(1916)
(1916)
(1916)
(916)
(1916)
2 Ch. 232.
2 Ch. 86.
2 Ch. 26.
2 Ch. 115.
2 Ch. 8.
2 Ch. 211.
2 Ch. 353.
2-Ch. 527.
void because it failed to truly state the con-
sideration for which it was given. In
Pearce v. Bultee121 a declaration was asked
as to who were the owners of certain prop-
erty. In Gilbert v. Gosport and Alverstoke
Urban District Council' 2 plaintiff asked the
court to declare that he owned certain land
free of any public right of way. In a
majority of the above cases there was a
present cause of action in the plaintiff,
which was either utilized as the basis for a
claim for relief.in addition to the declara-
tion of rights, or was abandoned in favor
of the declaration as a better remedy.
The cases where a declaration of rights
is the sole possible remedy are not easy to
classify. Perhaps no logical classification
is possible, for the whole matter of declara-
tory judgments is discretionary with the
court, and each case seems to go on its
own facts-as an appeal to the exercise of
that discretion. The scope of the applica-
tions for such declarations which the courts
have approved, and the corresponding
limitations upon the remedial possibilities
in American practice, may be roughly
shown under the following heads, merely as
a means of convenient presentation.
.1. A declaration of rights may be had
where there is a present possibility of im-
mediately creating a cause of action, as by
a demand or refusal, but the parties have
not done so, perhaps through reluctance to
precipitate a conflict. This is the typical
case for a friendly application to the court.
It avoids the necessity of formal hostili-
ties, such as American friendly suits re-
quire, and enables the parties to show on
the face of the record that thdre has been a
forbearance of any peremptory action.
Thus, while an action on a contract, either
for specific performance or damages, re-
quires the allegation and proof of a breach
by the defendant, a declaration of rights
would seem to be available without any
such allegation.
(21) (1916) 2 Oh. 544.
(22) (1916)- 2 Ch. 587.
No. ICENTRAL LA&W JOURNAL
VOL. 88 CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
In Williams, Hollins & Co., Lim. v.
Paget,"a defendant was a manager employed
by the plaintiff, under a salary and a con-
tract for additional compensation. There
were two possible methods of computing
the additional compensation. The manager
insisted on the higher, the employer on the
lower basis of computation. Instead of
creating a cause of action for damages by
a demand on the part of the manager and
a refusal on the part of the employer, the
parties obtained a declaration from the
court as to the true basis of computation.
In Rawlinson v. Mort"4 the court made a
declaration that a certain organ, which had
come rightfully into the possession of the
defendants, was the property of the plain-
tiff, although no demand for it had ever
been made upon the defendants.
In H. Newsum & Co., Lim., v. 3radley,2 5
the plaintiffs were indorsees of bills of lad-
ing for the carriage of a cargo of. wood in
defendants steamship Jupiter from Arch-
angel to Hull. The ship was torpedoed by
a German submarine, and the crew were
compelled by the enemy to leave her. Sub-
sequently she was towed into a Scottish
port by a British patrol boat, and the
plaintiffs claimed the right tb take posses-
sion of the goods without payment of
freight. The parties agreed to allow the
ship to proceed with her cargo to Hull sub-
ject to plaintiff's rights as of the date when
she lay in the Scottish port, and this ac-
tion was commenced for a declaration by
the court as to what those rights were, no
demand or refusal appearing to have been
made. The declaration was given as asked
by the plaintiffs.
An extremely large and varied class of
cases of this kind arises out of the con-
struction of written instruments, fixing the
mutual rights of parties. Here present
claims for 'relief might 'be created through
action by one party hostile to the rights
(23) (1917) 86 L. J. Ch. 297.
(24) (1905) 93 L. T. 555.
(25 ) (1917) 86 L. J. K. B. 1238.
asserted by another party, but under Order
54A, Rule I, such a course is rendered en-
tirely unnecessary. A doubt having arisen
as to the meaning or effect of the instru-
ment, this is enough to make it possible for
any party concerned to present to the court
the question upon which the doubt hinges.
A typical case is Cyclists' Touring Club
v. Hopkinson, 2 where certain members of
the plaintiff club desired to grant a pension
to the club's secretary, who had filled that
office for many years. A minority voted
,against the pension. The question was
raised whether under the articles of asso-
ciation such action would be valid and this
suit was brought solely to determine the
question of power under the articles, no ac-
tion having been taken nor threatened pur-
suant to the vote to grant the pension. The
court declared that the granting of, such a
pension would not be ultra vires.
In. Re Smith27 the plaintiffs asked the
court to declare that by virtue of a certain
contract made by them with one Smith, in
his lifetime, they were entitled to have
Smith's executors execute to them a legal
mortgage upon certain property belonging
to the estate as security for certain ad-
vances. The declaration was made.
Similar instances might be indefinitely
multiplied, but the principle underlying
them is plain and seems to call for no
further illustration. American practice
limits bills for instructions to cases where
there is some independent ground of equit-
able jurisdiction, such as trusts.2
2. Where one party only has a present
right of action for legal or equitable relief,
but the other will suffer a serious prejudice
by delay in bringing it into court, the latter
may have a declaration of rights.
Under American practice the courts can
give the latter party no relief. He must
helplessly wait until the party who has the
cause of action chooses to sue him, even
(26). (1906) 101 L. T. 848.
(27) (1916) 2 Ch. 206.
(28) I Whitehouse Equity, Sec. 129.
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though the delay serves only to pile up the
damages which he may eventually have to
pay.
For example, suppose a patentee claims
that a manufacturer is infringing his patent.
The patentee has a cause of action of the
conventional type, but the manufacturer
has not. The patentee can sue. the manu-
facturer, but the latter cannot sue him. The
'manufacturer may have a large investment
in the machinery for making the .disputed
device, and may have spent large sums in
advertising it. Upon the patentee's asser-
tion of patent rights, the manufacturer
must either discard his machinery, abandon
his investment, and lose the good-will he has
built up, or continue to operate under the
constant threat of an action for damages
whenever the patentee thinks that sufficient-
ly large damages have accrued to make a
law suit a profitable venture. If a declara-
tion of rights could be had, the manufac-
turer could at once apply for a determina-
tion of the validity of the asserted patent,
and thus save himself from the risk of seri-
ous loss and injury.
Such was the case presented in North
Eastern Marine Engineering Co. v. Leeds
Forge Co., 29 where defendants claimed that
plaintiffs were infringing their patents.
Plaintiffs asked for a, declaration that de-
fendants' patents were invalid and that
plaintiffs had not invaded any of the de-
denfants' legal rights. Had the Patents
and Trade-marks Act not offered an ade-
quate remedy in just such a case-a remedy
which the American patent law does not
give 3 -the court would have given the dec-
laration.
Another common instance of such a
situation occurs where one makes separate
contracts with two other parties, and one
or each of the latter claims that his contract
is broken by the contract with the other,
as where two jobbers each claim exclusive
(29) (1906) 1 Ch. 324.
(30) The remedy offered under Ameirican
practice is limited to a finding upon conflicting
patents. U. S. R. S., See. 4918.
rights in the same territory under separate
contracts with the manufacturer. Here the
manufacturer has no present cause of ac-
tion for relief, and can only wait until
sued by one or both of the jobbers. This
situation is always possible where contem-
porary contracts are made with different
persons respecting the same subject mat-
ter. Provision for declarations of rights
would offer a satisfactory solution and
would merely put into force the equitable
rule of mutuality of remedy.
3. Where the plaintiff has no ground
'for relief but there is a probability, though
not a threat, that the defendant may assert
rights hostile to him, a declaration of rights
may be had.3 1
4. Where a cause of action for relief
is in a condition which might be called
inchoate, and lapse of time is necessary to
perfect it, the court will declare the rights
of the parties, as in Austin v. Collins, 32
where a forfeiture of a life estate was to
result unless a certain condition should be
performed within a year, and the tenant
got a declaration before the year was out
that impossibility of performance would
excuse the failure to perform the condition,
or in West v. Lord Sackville, 33 where a
remainderman got a declaration) as to his
title prior to the death of the life tenant,
or in Powell & Thomas v. Evans Jones &
Co., 34 where a judgment was given for cer-
tain money received and a declaration re-
specting such further sums as might sub-
sequently be received.
5. When the plaintiff has and can have
no cause of action for relief, but his deal-
ings with third persons depend on the deter-
mination of questions arising between him-
self and the defendant, a declaration of
rights will be made.
In Jenkins v. Price,3" the lessee of a hotel
wished to assign her lease, but under its
(31) Hopkinson v. Mortimer, Harley & Co.,
(1917) 86 L. J. Ch. 467.
(32) (1886) 54 L. T. 903.
(33) (1903) 2 Ch. 378.
(34) (1905) 1 K. B. 11.
(35) (1907) 2 Ch. 229.
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terms could not do so without the lessor's
consent, unless such consent was unreason-
ably refused. The lessor refused. The
lessee, in order to place herself in a posi-
tion where she could deal with her proposed
assignee, asked for a declaration that the
refusal was unreasonable and released her
from the restriction against assignment.
This declaration was given.
Lord Justice Vaughan Williams, in a
similar case3 6 used very strong language in
support of the practice, saying :-" * * * It
seems to me that it would be quite shock-
ing if the Court could not put an end to
the dispute in the way the learned judge
has done by this order. I mean it would
be quite shocking if * * * the Court were
bound to say, 'Although we have the whole
matter before us * * * we must leave mat-
ters in this state, that the landlord may
continue to abstain from granting his
license and the tenant must assign at his
own risk-that is, at the risk of forfeiture.' "
A similar situation arises in case of at-
tempted sales of property in which others
claim 'rights. The prospective purchaser
does not care to buy a lawsuit, and only by
a declaration of right against the claimant
can the title be made merchantable in cases
where a bill to quiet title would not lie.
Thus, in Re Burroughs-Fowler, 37 a trus-
tee in bankruptcy offered property for sale,
but the prospective purchaser objected that
the title was defective. The trustee there-
upon applied for a declaration that he was
able to convey a good title, and the court
so declared.
In Re Trafford's Settled Estates38 1 the
applicant wished to sell certain lands which
he acquired under a will, freed from cer-
tain annuities which were created by the
same will. He could do so only if he was
a person having the powers of a tenant for
life and asked for a declaration that he had
(36) Young v. Ashley Gardens Properties,
Lirm. (1903) 2 Ch. 112.
(37) (1916) 2 Ch. 251.
(38) (1915) 1 Ch. 9.
such powers. The court decided the ques-
tion so presented.
6. Where there is no present cause of
action in the ordinary sense but the accrual
of such a cause of action will subject the
plaintiff to the risk of penalties, the court
will declare the rights of the parties.
In such a case the plaintiff is not required
to incur the risk of the penalties, but may
obtain a declaration to inform himself of
his rights in anticipation of penal liability."
The question was thoroughly argued in a
number of cases involving the inquisitorial
powers of crown. officers, and the judges
all agreed that the anticipatory declaration
of rights was an eminently suitable remedy.
Thus, in Burghes v. Attorney-General39
the Commissioners of internal revenue had
required plaintiff to make certain returns
respecting rents paid out or received, for
the purpose of fixing duties on land values.
The plaintiff asked the court for a declara-
tion that he was not 'bound to give the in-
formation demanded. Warrington, J., said:
"The complaint is that officers of the
Crown are demanding information they are
not entitled to, and, to say the least of it,
reminding the subject of unpleasant con-
sequences which may ensue if it is refused.
It seems to me immaterial whether the
terms of the notice amount to an actual
threat: the reference to the penalty is
plainly intended to intimate to the plaintiff
that compliance can, and will, be compelled
if necessary. If the -question be not de-
cided in this way it must be left open until
the plaintiff, having refused to comply, is
sued for penalties, and the plaintiff would
be left in a 'position of great perplexity. In
my opinion, the mode adopted by the plain-
tiff for obtaining a decision is a very con-
venient one, enabling the Commissioners
to be informed how far they may go, and
relieving the plaintiff from the doubt and
perplexity into which he has been cast."
Another action of the same kind was
brought in the King's Bench Division, and
the Court of Appeal took the same view as
Warrington, J., in the Burghes case. This
was Dyson v. Attorney-General, 0 in which
(39) (1911) 2 Ch. 139, 155.
(40) (1911) I K. B. 410, 421 ff.
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Farwell, L. J., speaking in the Court of
Appeal, said:-
"It is obviously a question of the greatest
importance; more than eight millions of
Form IV [the form on which the informa-
tion was required to be given] have been
sent out in England, and the questions
asked entail much trouble and in many cases
considerable expense in answering; it
would be a blot on our system of law and
procedure if there is no way by which a
decision on the true limit of the power of
inquisition vested in the Commissioners
can be obtained by any member of the pub-
lic aggrieved, without putting himself in
the invidious position of being sued for a
penalty *' * "
The latest case of this kind is Ertel
Bieber & Co. v. Rio Tinto Co. 41 The Rio
Tinto Co., an.English company, owned large
mines in Spain, and was under contract to
sell to the plaintiffs, which were German
companies doing business in England, sev-
eral million tons of ore over a period of
four years, for delivery at various conti-
nental ports. *The question arose whether
these contracts were abrogated by the Brit-
ish Trading with the Enemy Act. Under
our practice the Rio Tinto Co. would have
been faced with the dilemma of going
ahead with the contracts and taking the
risk of incurring penalties under the Act,
or stopping performance and laying itself
open to actions for large damages. What
it did was to commence an action for a
declaration that it was no longer bound by
the contracts, and the declaration was
promptly made by the court.
7. Where plaintiff as a strict matter of
law, has a right to an injunction, yet on ac-
count of the peculiar facts of the case the
court may prefer to substitute a declaration
of right as a more suitable remedy.
In Vestry of St. Mary, Islington v.
Hornsey Urban District Council, 2 the
plaintiffs, a metropolitan vestry, agreed to
allow defendants, a district outside the
metropolitan area, to discharge their sew-
age into plaintiffs' sewer, but after many
(41) (1918) H-. L. 260.
(42) (1900) 1 Ch. 695.
years operation it was found that this ad-
ditional sewage periodically stopped up
plaintiffs' sewer. The agreement was ultra
vires and void. The plaintiffs sought an
injunction to restrain defendants from dis-
charging sewage into plaintiffs' sewers. It
was held that while the court had power to
grant the injunction, yet, in view of the dif-
ficulty in which it would place defendants
if obliged to close sewers in daily use, the
Court would only make a declaration estab-
lishing plaintiffs' right to relief, to give de-
fendants time to make other arrangements,
with leave to apply for an injunction after
the expiration of a reasonable time.
S. Where relief can only be granted in
a foreign jurisdiction, the respective rights
of the parties may be fixed by a declaration
as an aid to the foreign adjudication.
In The Manarj the plaintiffs were mort-
gagees of the British ship Manar, and op
default in payment of the mortgage they
had taken possession and chartered the
ship for a voyage to France. On arrival
there the defendants, Strach'an Brothers,
British subjects, arrested the ship and
freight, claiming as creditors of the mort-
gagors for necessaries furnished to the ship.
It appeared to be in dispute whether the
French court would apply the English law in
determining whether the plaintiffs as mort-
gagees or the defendants as necessaries
men were entitled to the possession of the.
ship and freight. The plaintiffs asked for
a declaration that they were entitled to the
ship and freight as against defendants. It
was held that since it was not clear from
the evidence what effect a judgment in this
action would have in France, and since it
had not been shown that the declaration
sought would not be of practical utility to
plaintiffs in the French Court, the declara-
tion would be given.
I want to *emphasize two points-ln con-
nection with this practice.
First. It does not contemplate the
hearing of moot or abstract cases by the
(4f") (1902) P. 95.
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courts. In every case there is an actual
controversy between parties who urge con-
flicting claims.
Second. It has nothing in common with
the practice provided for in a few states,
whereby the executive or legislative depart-
ment of the state may call upon the Su-
preme Court for its opinion upon important
questions of law, or whereby the court may
render judgment in advance upon such
questionsoas the legality of a municipal
bond issue. The difficulty with that pro-
cedure is that the court does not have the
benefit of argument by interested parties,
nor is it able to gauge the effect of a de-
cision disassociated from the saving re-
strictions of a concrete case. The declara-
tory judgment is always the result of an
actually litigated concrete controversy be-
tween parties who represent every interest
involved and are actually before the court.
It seems quite evident that England has
far surpassed this country in devising
remedial methods calculated to make the
courts useful and available under the exact-
ing requirements of modern civilization.
We have canonized the ancient tradition of
a cause of action, in all its original crude-
ness, and have made it the condition and
the measure of judicial action. We have
failed utterly to see the enormous and far-
reaching possibilities in preventive relief,-
prevention not merely of threatened wrongs
but prevention of uncertainty and mis-
understanding in the assertion of rights.
Yet here is an effective, workable system,
tried out under conditions identical with
those in our own country, which marks an
advance over previous doctrines comparable
to the great reform which equity made over
the harsh rules of the common law. Its
use would entail no reconstruction of our
judicial machinery, no readjustment of
other elements in our remedial system.
I am inclined to think that the Supreme
Court of the United States has recognized
the principle of the declaratory judgment
in several recent cases. Thus, in Brushaber
ment must sail.*
Ef
Ann Arbor, Mich.
)SON R. SUNDERLAND.
(44) 240 U. S. 10.
(45) 187 U. S. 459.
*The foregoing article is the author's re-
vision of an address delivered at the meeting
of the Michigan State Bar Association, held at
Kalamazoo, Michigan, June 28 and 29, 1918,
which aroused much interest. It is worthy
of careful thought and should provoke a dis-
cussion of what will probably be the next im-
portant reform in the administration of justice
in this country.
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v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 4 an action was
brought by a stockholder against the cor-
poration to enjoin the payment of taxes.
The real defendant was the United States
Government, but it was not formally made
a party and no relief was asked against it.
However, the government actually appeared
in the guise of an amicus curiae and took
part in the suit, under the tacit understand-
ing that the decision of the question in-
volved would be considered as fixing the
rights of the government in the premises.-
Another case very much like this is Corbus
v. Gold Mining Co." In both cases the re-
lief asked was a mere formality, and in
view of Section 3224 of the United States
Revised Statutes, forbidding .any suit for
the purpose of 'restraining the collection of
any tax, it would seem that a decree for
relief would have been wholly ineffectual,
the determination and declaration of rights
was the real object of each suit, and so far
as the government was concerned the judg-
ment was a declaratory judgment.
The theory and operation of the English
rules respecting the declaration of rights
are perfectly simple. By adopting the
language of the English rules, Order 25,
Rule 5, authorizing declarations of rights,
and the supplementary, though possibly un-
necessary, rule, Order 54A, Rule 1,
authorizing the judicial construction of
documents, we might enjoy the fruits of
England's experience, enriched as it is by
the thirty-five years' labor which her courts
have devoted to charting the waters over
which the applicant for a declaratory judg-
\70L. 88
